India’s defense exports are creating an informal counterweight along Beijing’s maritime perimeter
FOR DECADES, strategic planners in New Delhi watched with quiet trepidation as Beijing systematically cultivated influence along India’s land and maritime borders. From heavy investments in Sri Lankan infrastructure and military supplies to Pakistan to shifting political dynamics in Bangladesh and the Maldives, the presence of Chinese capital and defense hardware in South Asia appeared near-ubiquitous. Today, a subtle yet calculated shift is taking place. While China expanded its footprint in India’s immediate neighborhood, India has begun forging a counter-ring of defense partnerships along China’s own maritime backyard.
At the center of this evolving geopolitical posture is the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, a joint venture originally developed between India and Russia. Long regarded primarily as a cornerstone of India’s domestic deterrence, the missile system has rapidly turned into an instrument of regional security architecture across Southeast Asia.
The catalyst for this accelerated foreign demand stems from dynamic real-world validation. During recent military strikes in Pakistan designated as Operation Sindoor, the BrahMos system demonstrated an ability to breach imported Chinese-supplied air defense systems. High-value military installations, including airbases at Norkhan, Sargodha, and Muneer, were targeted with precision. In the arms trade, where peace-time performance claims are often met with skepticism, battlefield proof carries unmatched weight. The failure of Chinese-built air defense networks to intercept the supersonic missile sent a strong signal to defense ministries across Asia.
The commercial impact was swift. The Philippines became the pioneer customer with a $375m order placed in 2022 itself to strengthen its coastal defense capabilities. Vietnam followed with a deal valued at roughly 5,900 crore rupees ($700m), while Indonesia lined up a 1,900 crore rupees ($225m) agreement to procure two batteries of the missile system. Beyond these committed buyers, both Malaysia and Thailand are actively evaluating potential acquisitions.
What unites these buyer nations is geography and shared security concerns. Each shares a maritime boundary with China, and each remains embroiled in territorial friction over the South China Sea, a waterway through which roughly 21% of global trade navigates. Beijing claims sovereignty over approximately 90% of these waters, a posture that frequently leads to standoffs with smaller Southeast Asian littoral states over disputed islands and EEZ boundaries.
The strategic layout of these prospective BrahMos deployments directly targets key maritime chokepoints. The Strait of Malacca, flanked by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, handles nearly 80% of China’s total crude oil imports along with a substantial volume of its commercial exports. In response, India has not only marketed hardware to these littoral states but has also undertaken infrastructure development at Strategic ports like Sabang in Indonesia, located near the northern entrance of the strait.
Further northeast lies the Luzon Strait between Taiwan and the Philippines, serving as a primary naval gateway connecting the South China Sea to the broader Pacific Ocean. By supplying coastal defense variants of the BrahMos to the Philippines, India provides its regional partners with a shore-based anti-ship capability capable of denying unhindered maritime access through critical ocean corridors.
Officially, the Indian government avoids framing these defense transactions as a deliberate attempt to contain Beijing. New Delhi maintains that its growing military exports are driven purely by commercial objectives and bilateral security requests. The involved hardware itself carries a layer of diplomatic complexity, given that BrahMos is co-developed with Russia, a nation maintaining close diplomatic relations with Beijing.
Furthermore, traditional multilateral frameworks intended to balance regional power dynamics have seen shifting momentum. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, has experienced period calibration as American foreign policy shifts toward economic risk reduction rather than direct confrontation with China.
Yet, functional realities often outweigh formal declarations. Whether born of a master strategic blueprint or a convergence of commercial opportunities, a distinct BrahMos Belt is emerging around China’s sea lanes. As Beijing maintains a heavy footprint in South Asia, New Delhi is proving that a network of well-armed littoral partners can balance the scales in the Western Pacific.