The view from Muzaffarabad is increasingly one of defiance. For decades, the narrow strip of land known as Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) has been held up by Islamabad as a symbol of its ideological struggle with India. Yet, the current reality suggests that the greatest threat to Pakistan’s grip on this territory is not external aggression, but internal collapse. A wave of mass protests, led by the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee, has exposed a fundamental rift between the region’s residents and the Pakistani state. This is not merely a dispute over administrative boundaries; it is a rejection of a system that treats the territory as a colony rather than a constituent part of a nation.
The immediate triggers for the unrest are economic. Inflation in Pakistan has spiraled out of control, peaking at nearly 38 percent. In PoK, the pain is magnified by a sense of systemic exploitation. The region produces approximately 2,600 megawatts of hydroelectric power, yet its residents consume barely 350 megawatts while facing exorbitant electricity tariffs. Protesters argue that under Article 157 of the Pakistani constitution, provinces should benefit from their own natural resources. Instead, they find themselves subsidizing the energy needs of the Punjabi heartland while enduring chronic blackouts and rising costs.
Political marginalization adds fuel to the fire. The legislative assembly in PoK consists of 45 seats, but 12 of these are reserved for Kashmiri refugees living in mainland Pakistan, primarily in Punjab and Sindh. This arrangement ensures that Islamabad can maintain a loyalist bloc within the local government, effectively diluting the representation of those who actually reside in the territory. To many in Muzaffarabad and Rawalakot, this is a clear sign that they are viewed as second-class citizens. The rhetoric from the streets has shifted from demands for reform to a more existential question of identity. Some leaders have gone so far as to declare that they are no longer part of Pakistan, looking instead toward the relative stability and infrastructure growth across the Line of Control in Indian-administered Kashmir.
This regional crisis is a microcosm of the broader failures of the Pakistani state. The country is currently kept afloat by International Monetary Fund bailouts, with foreign exchange reserves frequently dipping to levels that barely cover a month of imports. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has admitted, with some bitterness, that the international community views Pakistan as a beggar. While the citizenry struggles for basic necessities, a disproportionate share of national resources continues to be swallowed by a military establishment that remains the true arbiter of power. Field Marshal Asim Munir exerts more influence over foreign policy and domestic governance than any elected official, a fact not lost on a population weary of indirect military rule.
The unrest is not confined to the north. In Balochistan, the Baloch Liberation Army has long maintained that the province is under occupation, appealing to international bodies for recognition as a sovereign state. Similar sentiments are rising in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while even the core provinces of Punjab and Sindh are locked in bitter disputes over water rights and irrigation projects. The Pakistani state appears to be fraying at the edges, its social contract shredded by decades of economic mismanagement and political suppression.
Historically, India has been careful to respect the Line of Control, even during periods of intense provocation. However, the strategic calculus is changing. The 2019 Balakot strikes marked a departure from previous norms, as Indian jets crossed the international border to strike targets in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Domestically, the debate in India has grown more assertive. Critics of the current administration argue that opportunities to reclaim PoK, such as during periods of extreme Pakistani vulnerability, were missed. Proponents of the government, meanwhile, point to the 1971 war and the creation of Bangladesh as the ultimate example of decisive action under a different political era.
Regardless of the political debates in New Delhi, the situation on the ground in PoK suggests that Pakistan’s traditional narrative is failing. When a government responds to civilian protests with food blockades and lethal force, it loses the moral authority to claim those people as its own. The residents of PoK are observing the development of all-weather roads, flyovers, and tunnels in Jammu and Kashmir and drawing their own conclusions. Islamabad’s strategy of keeping the region in a state of perpetual anti-India mobilization is no longer working as an effective distraction from the hunger and disenfranchisement at home.
The risk for Pakistan is that it is now bleeding from within. The policy of seeking to inflict a thousand cuts on its neighbor has resulted in a state that is itself suffering from deep, self-inflicted wounds. If the current trajectory continues, the map of the region may eventually be redrawn not by an invading army, but by the weight of a state that can no longer sustain its own contradictions. For the people of Muzaffarabad, the promise of the Pakistani state has been replaced by the reality of a colonial administration, and their patience is at an end.