WHEN shipping lanes narrow, geopolitical levers widen. For months, international commerce has watched tension escalate across key maritime choke points. Even before the friction surrounding the Strait of Hormuz showed signs of easing, a new crisis flared further west along the Red Sea. At the heart of this confrontation lies the Bab-el-Mandeb, a narrow maritime pass between 20 and 29 kilometres wide that connects the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
Control over this passage is shifting rapidly. Houthi forces have gained a firm foothold along the western coast of the Red Sea, taking control of key logistical hubs, including the port of Mocha. With this operational grip, the Houthis have asserted influence over the strait itself, restricting access and explicitly targeting vessels associated with Saudi Arabia.
The consequences for global energy flows are direct and profound. While roughly 20 percent of global oil historically passes through the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab-el-Mandeb accounts for around 7 percent of global petroleum transit. Since conflict erupted between Israel and Gaza, maritime security in the Red Sea has degraded steadily. Daily oil shipments moving through the Bab-el-Mandeb dropped from approximately 9.3m barrels per day in 2023 to 4.2m barrels per day by 2025.
To circumvent disruptions in the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia relied on its East-West Pipeline to redirect crude to Yanbu on the Red Sea coast, enabling onward shipment to European and Asian markets. With the Bab-el-Mandeb increasingly constrained, that bypass strategy faces severe limits.
Distant Choke Points, Immediate Shockwaves
Though the strait lies three thousand kilometres from the Indian subcontinent, the shockwaves reach Indian markets quickly. India relies heavily on crude imports from Saudi Arabia alongside buyers in China, South Korea, and Japan. Interruption to Saudi shipments directly threatens energy security across Asia, pushing global crude prices upward. During recent supply panics, benchmark prices breached 109 dollars per barrel, highlighting how sensitive global markets remain to maritime bottlenecks.
Beyond raw crude imports, India occupies an underappreciated position in the global petroleum supply chain. The country imports large volumes of crude, refines it in mega-refineries, and exports finished products globally. In August 2026, India supplied 60 percent of Europe's diesel imports. Blocking transit through the Bab-el-Mandeb and Suez forces cargo ships around the Cape of Good Hope, adding over 50 percent to distance traveled, elevating freight rates, insurance premiums, and transit times.
The collateral damage extends beyond energy. While earlier closures in the Gulf hit Indian agricultural exports such as basmati rice, a prolonged Red Sea impasse imperils broader trade with Europe. Indian exporters of pharmaceuticals, textiles, and engineering machinery face higher freight overheads, delayed deliveries, and diminished competitiveness.
The Strategy of Shared Pain
This pattern mirrors asymmetric strategy seen throughout the region. When regional actors target maritime choke points, the goal is often to internationalize domestic pressures. The underlying calculation relies on leverage: by disrupting global supply chains, regional forces force outside powers to absorb economic pain, compelling them to pressure local rivals.
For now, restrictions in the Red Sea target specific commercial fleets. However, if maritime blockades expand to broader shipping traffic, global trade faces compounded costs. As a major exporter of energy, Saudi Arabia's access to international markets remains crucial for worldwide economic stability. Even when regional conflict feels distant, choking narrow straits brings immediate disruption to global trade.